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How do normal people become able to torture others? In order to explain this puzzling social phenomenon, we have to take secrecy – the characteristic trait 
of modern torture – as the lynchpin of the analysis. Following Georg Simmel’s formal analysis of the “secret society”, the contribution reconstructs structural 
and cultural aspects of the secret society of torturers that generate social processes that allow its members to behave extremely violently, forcing individuals 
to turn into torturers. The contribution argues that the form of social behaviour that we call torture is socially shaped. It goes beyond social psychology to de-
velop an explanation from the perspective of relational sociology.
When it comes to torture, nothing is as horrifying as real-
ising what people are capable of doing unto others. It is 
virtually impossible to understand how torturers can 
physically and/or psychologically abuse or even kill while 
at the same time being caring fathers and loving husbands 
(Browning 1992; Conroy 2000). However, as with war 
criminals or terrorists, neither generally declaring the per-
petrators insane psychopaths or sadists nor searching for 
their individual motives or interests enables us to fully 
explain this deeply puzzling social phenomenon. Rather, 
we will only be able to understand torture if we perceive it 
as a consequence of the social shaping of interactions 
within a specific social form. Interactions create social 
forms that in turn shape behaviour. This is the case in 
families, friendships, clubs, and associations, and even in 
nations. The same applies to the creation of groups of tor-
turers that shape the behaviour of those who do the “dirty 
work”. In this sense, torture is not anti-social but brought 
about by the social form that torturers are actively 
involved in.
In order to develop an approach that may explain the social 
shaping of torturers’ extremely violent behaviour, the pres-
ent article restricts the analysis to torture executed “in the 
name of a state” as an instrument of “state terror” (Sluka 
2000).1 We can conceive torture as a form of collective viol-
ence; a purposive act performed by coordinated social 
actors in order to gather information, to make individuals 
betray alleged co-conspirators, partisans, etc. Rather than 
being executed for its own sake as pure “excesses of viol-
ence” (Sofsky 1997), we can therefore define torture as “a) 
the intentional infliction of extreme physical suffering on 
some non-consenting, defenceless person; (b) the inten-
tional, substantial curtailment of the exercise of the per-
son’s autonomy (achieved by means of (a)); (c) in general, 
undertaken for the purpose of breaking the victim’s will” 
(Miller 2008).2
In the context of cycles of political attention, torture has 
been a widely discussed topic in sociology for some time 
now. Examining torture regimes in South America and 
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1 Here, I do not discuss the violent behaviour of 
individuals acting alone that is sometimes portrayed 
in movies. See, inter alia, John Schlesinger’s Mara-
thon Man 1976, Quentin Tarantino’s Reservoir Dogs 
1992, or Michael Haneke’s Funny Games 1997.
2 Evidently, extreme psychological abuse also 
belongs in this brief definition.
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southern Europe, Jan Philipp Reemtsma (1991a) outlined a 
research programme on torture as a social phenomenon, 
while detailed case studies exist for countries such as 
Argentina (Feitlowitz 1998; Lewis 2002), Chile (Ensalaco 
2000), Brazil (Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo 
2002), Greece (Haritos-Fatouros 2003), and Cambodia 
(Chandler 1999). In recent years, systematic torture in the 
so-called “war on terror” has triggered debates not only in 
the United States (Cohen 2005; Hersh 2004; Jaffer and 
Singh 2007; Koch 2008; Mayer 2008; McCoy 2006). In 
comparative studies, Cohen and Corrado (2005), Green-
berg and Dratel (2005), Einolf (2007), and MacMaster 
(2004) have analysed torture as a means of domination in 
Western democracies; further, Linklater (2007) has con-
textualised torture within the general process of civili-
sation, while Reemtsma (2012) discusses in detail extreme 
violence as perpetrated by torturers as a basic constituent 
of modernity itself. The consequences of torture for the 
victims is the main focus in Asad (1996), Conroy (2000), 
Hooks and Mosher (2005), and Sofsky (2005), while 
recently von Trotha’s (2011) outline of a “sociology of 
cruelty” and Inhetveen’s (2011) study of a sociology of the 
body have opened up new perspectives for a sociological 
debate on torture.
The present article contributes to this important debate 
from the perspective of a relational sociology. It argues 
that in order to explain what enables individuals to behave 
extremely violently and turns them into torturers, we have 
to do more than provide highly interesting insights from 
experiments in social psychology – illustrating the trait of 
unquestioning obedience (Milgram 1974) – or examine 
the social system/hierarchy within which they act (Zim-
bardo 2009). Obviously, social psychology stresses factors 
that have a direct effect on the individual, such as being 
trained, indoctrinated, or selected, examining both the 
ability to torture and the situation of torture itself. The 
present article goes a step further, and argues that we have 
to take into consideration the wider social relations affect-
ing torturers, the critical factor being that their social 
organisation can be defined as a secret society. In order to 
integrate torture as a tool of power with an explanation of 
the shaping of torture as a form of social behaviour, I 
depart from the basic assumption that secrecy is the most 
significant aspect of torture as a modern phenomenon 
that generates opportunity structures for this form of 
social behaviour.
To develop this argument, the article begins with a closer 
look at different aspects of secrecy, before briefly outlining 
Georg Simmel’s classic analysis of “The Sociology of 
Secrecy and of Secret Societies” (1906). By applying this 
formal and relational approach to the secret society of tor-
turers, secrecy becomes the lynchpin of the present analy-
sis,3 which discusses both cultural and structural traits of 
this form of association. Against this background, it finally 
explains the social shaping of torturers’ behaviour.
1. Four Aspects of Secrecy
With regard to the nexus between torture and secrecy, we 
have to distinguish at least four aspects. First, as Foucault 
(1979) has generally shown, unlike historical forms of mar-
tyrdom that were practised in public, “modern torture” is 
executed in secrecy (Grüny 2003, Rejali 2007). However, 
Reemtsma (1991b, 253) has pointed out that this gener-
alised and often-mentioned aspect holds only for the pub-
lic martyring that was practised to serve as a deterrent and 
to demonstrate the unlimited power of secular and relig-
ious authority.
Second, and more recently, non-democratic and democratic 
states alike attempt to conceal torture as a tool of power. In 
its latest report, Amnesty International (2014) shows that 
people are tortured in 141 countries.4 None of these 
societies’ governments would openly admit to using or 
condoning torture. Either citizens are not really aware of 
what is happening, as in Chile under the Pinochet regime: 
“Abducted prisoners were taken to one of a number of 
secret detention centers, where they were held incommuni-
cado and interrogated under torture” (Ensalaco 2000, 90). 
3 A number of scholars refer to secrecy, con -
cealment or stealth (Rejali 2007) with respect to tor-
ture. Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo 
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Or, as occurs all over the globe, non-democratic, auth-
oritarian, or military regimes let their citizens know to 
some extent what they are doing to their opponents in 
order to cause anxiety among the entire population. 
Although torture may be an “open secret” in such cases, we 
know from countries like Argentina that it may require 
pressure – as exerted by social movements such as the 
“Madres de Plaza de Mayo” and others – to finally reveal 
the facts (in that case the existence of approximately five 
hundred secret torture prisons) (Feitlowitz 1998). In the 
modern age, all regimes draw a veil of secrecy over acts of 
torture.
Third, this applies in particular when it comes to torture in 
democracies. Here secrecy becomes obligatory, since by 
using torture democratic states knowingly violate their 
own moral foundations (cf. Rejali 2007, 16 ff., 569). This 
“dark side” of democracies is manifested in two forms. On 
the one hand, democracies may torture people themselves, 
as the United States did in Germany after World War II 
(McCoy 2006), in Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and the CIA’s 
secret prisons in Poland, Romania, and Lithuania; France 
in the wars in Algeria (Vidal-Naquet 1963, Fanon 1963) 
and Indochina; the United Kingdom in the conflict with 
the Irish Republican Army (Conroy 2000) and as the ruling 
power in Kenya (Benenson 1959); or Belgium in the Congo 
(Van Reybrouck 2014). On the other hand, democracies 
may accept and support torture by non-democratic 
regimes (McCoy 2006), even when their own citizens 
become victims. Germany provides a striking example. In 
May 1977, a young German citizen, Elisabeth Käsemann, 
was accused by the Argentine junta of being a terrorist. The 
innocent woman was abducted, raped, tortured, and finally 
killed on 24 May. While the military regime claimed her 
death occurred in a clash between armed guerrillas and the 
military, in fact the military killed a group of defenceless 
prisoners including Käsemann. Unlike the United King-
dom, France, or Austria, which intervened forcefully and 
successfully in cases of their own, the German government 
did not intervene to save her life, although the German 
ambassador and politicians were aware of what was hap-
pening. To this day, neither the foreign minister at the time, 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, nor the Chancellor, Helmut 
Schmidt, have been willing to speak openly about why they 
sacrificed a young woman to realpolitik by silently and 
knowingly supporting (and benefitting economically from) 
a military regime that violated human rights.5 Thus, as a 
tool of power, democracies and non-democracies alike are 
interested in keeping torture secret.
Finally, and this is the essence of the present article, a genu-
ine explanation of how and why people are able to torture 
others has to take seriously the social relations within 
groups of torturers. Without any doubt, recruitment pro-
cesses, schooling, and ideological indoctrination are of 
utmost importance (Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zim-
bardo 2002, 160–91); however, I argue, explaining the social 
shaping of torturers’ violent behaviour has to address the 
way this form of behaviour is triggered under conditions of 
secrecy, within the social context of a secret society. To 
introduce this argument, I will first briefly outline Georg 
Simmel’s (1906) formal and relational account of secrecy as 
a sociological fact.
2. The Formal Analysis of the Secret Society
Georg Simmel’s analysis of the secret society enables us to 
explain and understand both the way groups of torturers 
are organised and how this affects the behaviour of their 
members. In order to understand how and why torturers 
behave extremely violently, we have to perceive the 
formation of any secret society as a type of association 
(Vergesellschaftung), based on a shared secret that is fraught 
with consequences: “So soon, however, as a group as such 
seizes upon secrecy as its form of existence, the sociological 
meaning of the secrecy becomes internal. It now deter-
mines the reciprocal relations of those who possess the 
secret in common” (Simmel 1906, 470). The idea of reci-
procity is critical as it makes the social relations of actors 
5 The case of Elisabeth Käsemann was brought back 
to collective awareness recently by Eric Friedler’s 
2014 documentary Das Mädchen – Was geschah mit 
Elisabeth K.?
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the basis of the analysis and the starting point for examin-
ing the dynamics of the social processes that characterise 
these relations. Against this background, Simmel dif-
ferentiates between two forms of secret societies that both 
point to specific features of this type of association:
Its elements may live in the most frequent commerce, but that 
they compose a society – a conspiracy, or a band of criminals, a 
religious conventicle, or an association for sexual extravagances 
– may remain essentially and permanently a secret. This type, in 
which not the individuals but their combination is concealed, is 
sharply distinguished from the others, in which the social 
formation is unequivocally known, but the membership, or the 
purpose, or the special conditions of the combination are 
secrets. (470–471)
But why do secret societies emerge? Why do people turn to 
secrecy and why is the idea of secret societies of interest for 
an analysis of modern torture? Interestingly, Simmel not 
only refers to a “band of criminals”, but also formulates the 
general proposition that “the secret society emerges every-
where as correlate of despotism and of police control. It 
acts as protection alike of defence and of offense against 
the violent pressure of central powers” (472). And, import-
antly, Simmel further qualifies this, contending that what-
ever these bands do, we always observe a distinctive 
“radical break with moral imperatives” (473).
Simmel’s argument is “bottom-up”, describing criminal 
bands acting against a central power, thereby violating 
existing law. However, although this may apply to any kind 
of secret society, it is another matter altogether when it 
comes to torture as a means of rule of the central power 
itself. In this case, we need to take a “top-down” look, where 
the central power (or parts of it) itself turns into a criminal 
band that practises torture as a tool of power against its 
own citizenry and other individuals, thereby violating 
moral imperatives. In the case of a “secret society of tor-
turers” organised within a state’s institutions, both forms 
that Simmel distinguishes are bound together: when it 
comes to torture, we neither know (or will know) about the 
secret society of torturers itself, nor do we know (or will 
know) who its members are – although in some political 
regimes torture is a kind of open secret. We might guess 
only that groups of torturers are at work, but do not know 
who belongs to them. In other regimes, we see members of 
the police, military police, or military, but have no idea 
about the existence of a group of torturers within their 
ranks.
2.1. Secret Societies as Associations
Any association, be it secret or not, is characterised by a 
certain purpose of association and relies on a number of 
tenets of faith. In many cases, there is no reason to keep 
the purpose secret. For example, national communities are 
based on a sense of national belonging, political parties 
are built on shared political convictions and programmes, 
while the European Union claims to be founded on a 
common project. However, in the case of secret societies, 
their purpose can have crucial consequences: Given that a 
criminal band’s purpose is characterised by dissociation 
from the moral convictions of the wider society and delib-
erately breaking its shared moral rules, there are two vital 
aspects to keeping its purpose secret. First, the social 
relations of the secret society’s members must be based on 
confidence. Second, confidence is indispensable since the 
purpose of secrecy leads to the protection of both the 
secret society as a whole and its individual members (see 
Simmel 1906, 470). Obviously, to be so extremely depend-
ent on the confidence of all members of a secret society is 
a double-edged sword. Over time, members of a secret 
society might become disappointed or even horrified by 
the violence of their acts and disclose the secret, thereby 
betraying the secret society. The indispensable confidence 
that guarantees secrecy turns out to be the secret society’s 
Achilles heel:
The keeping of the secret is something so unstable, the temp-
tations to betrayal are so manifold, in many cases such a con-
tinuous path leads from secretiveness to indiscretion, that unli-
mited faith in the former contains an incomparable 
preponderance of the subjective factor. (473)
It turns out that secret societies are based on a precarious 
balance. While concealing their existence and purpose of 
association, they depend on the discretion of their 
members as the only possible protection; betrayal poten-
tially threatens their existence. Just how dangerous it will be 
for a secret society to be either betrayed or discovered dep-
ends on both the interest of association and the precautions 
taken in order to stabilize the social relations within it.
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The necessary stabilization of such a secret society results 
from two principles that are implemented into its organisa-
tional structure in order to oblige its members to adhere to 
the purpose of association: hierarchy and rituals both play a 
crucial role. Structurally, at least three elements create a 
clearly defined hierarchy in a secret society: the process of 
successive recruitment, a division of labour, and a rationalist 
structure. Culturally, however, for Simmel, a plurality of rites 
and formulae sets a secret society apart from open society:
That which is striking about the treatment of the ritual in secret 
societies is not merely the precision with which it is observed, 
but first of all the anxiety with which it is guarded as a secret – 
as though the unveiling of it were precisely as fatal as betrayal of 
the purposes and actions of the society, or even the existence of 
the society altogether. (480)
These forms of rituals within the secret society generate 
what Simmel calls “a well-rounded unity” (481) that both 
structurally and culturally influences its members’ behav-
iour. This impact is critical as it triggers specific demands 
upon the individual.
Finally, unlike ordinary life in open society, the “secret 
society must seek to create among the categories peculiar 
to itself, a species of life-totality” (481). Both content and 
form have to be kept secret “because only so can a har-
monious whole come into being, in which one part sup-
ports the other” (481).
This typical trait of the secret society has consequences for 
its members, since:
 “One of its essential characteristics is that, even when it takes 
hold of individuals only by means of partial interests, when the 
society in its substance is a purely utilitarian combination, yet it 
claims the whole man in a higher degree, it combines the per-
sonalities more in their whole compass with each other, and 
commits them more to reciprocal obligations, than the same 
common purpose would within an open society.” (481)
This is a form of idealisation of the secret society. By 
detaching itself from the wider society and closing itself 
off, the secret society develops its own structures and rit-
uals, and defines itself as much more significant than any 
other area of the lives of its members. This situation gener-
ates a specific structure of social relations that triggers 
complex and contradictory codes of conduct for members 
that cannot be reduced to individual dispositions or beliefs.
2.2. Social Closure: The Secret Society as a Counterpart to the Official World
From the perspective of closure theory, a form of associ-
ation without any processes of social closure is inconceiv-
able (see Weber 1967; Mackert 2012). Hence, the closure of 
the secret society to outsiders is a necessary and char-
acteristic feature. Rituals such as taking an oath or vow, or 
making a pledge of loyalty serve to reinforce and confirm 
its purpose. Therefore, we can define these as the vital 
mechanisms of social closure that increase the level of con-
cealment and advance processes of closure against the 
wider society, with crucial consequences:
Moreover, through such formalism, just as through the hier-
archical structure above discussed, the secret society constitutes 
itself a sort of counterpart of the official world with which it 
places itself in antithesis. Here we have a case of the universally 
emerging sociological norm; viz., structures, which place them-
selves in opposition to and detachment from larger structures in 
which they are actually contained, nevertheless repeat in them-
selves the forms of the greater structures. (Simmel 1906, 481–82)
Although closure leads to the development within the secret 
society of structures that correspond to those of the wider 
society, it is decisive that the closed secret society seeks to 
be an “antithesis” to the official world enclosing it. In the 
case of a secret society of torturers, the idea of antithesis 
refers to the breaking of the basic rules and norms of the 
wider society under the shelter of secrecy. This link is cen-
tral: it allows for an emerging freedom of the individual that 
transcends all moral and lawful regulation of behaviour:
Whether the secret society […] complements the inadequate 
judicature of the political area; or whether, as in the case of con-
spiracies or criminal bands, it is an uprising against the law of 
that area; or whether, as in the case of the “mysteries,” they hold 
themselves outside of the commands and prohibitions of the 
greater area, in either case the apartness (Heraussonderung) 
which characterizes the secret society has the tone of a freedom. 
In exercise of this freedom a territory is occupied to which the 
norms of the surrounding society do not apply. The nature of 
the secret society as such is autonomy. It is, however, of a sort 
which approaches anarchy. Withdrawal from the bonds of unity 
which procure general coherence very easily has as con-
sequences for the secret society a condition of being without 
roots, an absence of firm touch with life (Lebensgefühl), and of 
restraining reservations. (482)
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This point cannot be overemphasised, as it is key to under-
standing the ways in which social relations transform the 
conditions of individuals’ behaviour by providing oppor-
tunities for a kind of behaviour that was previously incon-
ceivable. The aspect of freedom is pivotal, as the release 
from moral and lawful constraints of the wider society 
resulting from the secret society’s closure and detachment 
in fact generates autonomy for a band of criminals, which 
can trigger violence and lead to anomic features (Mestrovic 
and Lorenzo 2008). This process has further consequences: 
closure against the wider society has follow-up costs for the 
individuals involved, such as feelings of uprootedness, a 
lack of stability, and the loss of normative support. But 
even in this case of tension between freedom and nor-
mative constraint, Simmel argues that the secret society’s 
rituals may have a compensatory and stabilising function: 
“With the ritual the secret society voluntarily imposes 
upon it a formal constraint, which is demanded as a com-
plement by its material detachment and self-sufficiency” 
(Simmel 1906, 483).
3. The Secret Society of Torturers
Against the background of Simmel’s formal analysis of the 
secret society, the analysis assumes that the “secret element 
in societies is a primary sociological fact” (Simmel 1906, 
483). Secrecy not only has consequences for social relations 
within the secret society but also provides opportunity 
structures that channel its members’ behaviour into tor-
ture. This is not to argue in a structuralist vein but to stress 
the social shaping of a specific behaviour as a consequence 
of interaction (Wechselwirkung).
3.1. A Dual Purpose
As an association organised within institutions of the state 
apparatus like the military, the military police, or the regu-
lar police, the secret society acts in secrecy in a twofold 
sense: neither the group itself nor its members are known 
to the wider society. This acting in secrecy follows from the 
purpose of a secret society of torturers, since as an instru-
ment of state terror, it has a dual purpose: first, to force vic-
tims to reveal everything they know about membership, 
strategies, tactics, and objectives of organisations and 
groups; second, to break the will of those defined as 
enemies:
While both purposes violate basic moral principles and 
standards codified in both national and international law 
(McEntee 1996), torture itself is extremely destructive in a 
double sense. First, it affects a person’s dignity in a way that 
disrupts his or her relationship to the world:
Whoever has succumbed to torture can no longer feel at home 
in the world. Trust in the world, which already collapsed in part 
of the first blow, but in the end, under torture, fully, will not be 
regained. That one’s fellow man was experienced as the antiman 
remains in the tortured person as accumulated horror. (Améry 
1980, 40)
Second, as we know from the long-term consequences in 
countries that suffered excesses of state terror, torture is a 
social phenomenon that triggers a collective trauma which 
Erickson defines as a “blow to the basic tissues of social life 
that damages the bonds attaching people together and 
impairs the prevailing sense of community” (1994, 233).
Consequently, not only the abstract violation of norms, 
values, or laws by state institutions but also torture’s con-
crete destructive effects on individual victims and the wider 
society make it necessary to keep the dual purpose secret. 
The extreme assault on both individuals’ lives and the social 
fabric of a society thus poses an enormous challenge to the 
members of the secret society of torturers with regard to the 
degree of mutual confidence its members have to establish 
and maintain to protect the secret society and themselves.
3.2. Hierarchy, Ritual and Violence
In the face of this double assault and given the fact that 
violence is constituent for the secret society of torturers, 
not only will enormous confidence among the secret 
society’s members be necessary to offer protection for 
members and association alike but, in the face of the sheer 
brutality involved, violence will also be a crucial means to 
subjugate the torturers themselves and avoid betrayal. 
Thus, while following Simmel’s idea that the precarious 
The purpose of torturing is to get their responses. It’s not some-
thing we do for the fun of it. […] Another purpose is to break 
them (psychologically) and to make them lose their will. It’s not 
something that’s done out of individual anger, or for self-satis-
faction. (S-21 Interrogator’s Manual of the Khmer Rouge, cited in 
Crelinsten 1995, 35)
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balance between mutual confidence and the risk of betrayal 
will be stabilised by hierarchy and rituals, we necessarily 
have to add violence as a third critical element.
First, the significance of both hierarchy and the principle of 
order and obedience is self-evident, as we know from ana-
lyses of military or police organisations (Jannowitz 1971; 
Bröckling 1996; Apelt 2012). This is not only true within 
these normally legitimated institutions within which the 
secret society of torturers operates but also with regard to 
illegitimate secret societies of torturers that reproduce 
these structural traits within themselves.
A secret society of torturers will also include people in top 
positions in the state and wider circles of secrecy (Cohen 
2005; Greenberg, and Dratel 2005) such as both national 
and “helpful” foreign secret services, as seen in Brazil under 
the military regime. Secrecy within these criminal bands is 
critical well beyond the inner circle: “[It was] interesting, 
provocative – everything […] had to be kept secret. […] 
The man in the secret service is very important to the state. 
We kept in touch with […] [American] consuls – [par-
ticularly] those who were CIA agents” (interview in Hug-
gins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo 2002, 96–7).
Second, rituals related to inclusion or specific activities 
commit members to one another and institutionalise regu-
larities, reinforcing both their ties and their mutual moni-
toring. Initiation rituals are of utmost importance in order 
to bend recruits to obey their superiors and to subjugate 
them under military discipline, as reported by former tor-
turers of the Greek military junta:
It started with an initiation ceremony on the first day of arrival 
at the ESA [Greek military police] training camp. After an initi-
ation beating inside the cars taking the recruits to the camp and 
upon entering the camp, recruits were asked to swear allegiance 
to the totemic-like symbol of authority used by the junta, prom-
ising, on their knees, faith to their commander-in-chief and to 
the revolution. (Haritos-Fatouros 1988, 1114)
Third, as initiation rituals are often already violent, violence 
and threats become typical of the personal situation of 
those who are part of a secret society of torturers at the 
lower level doing the dirty work. The recruits:
As well as the experience of violence, threats against ser-
vicemen and their families are also used as instruments to 
stabilise the secret society as a whole. As one reported, “an 
officer used to tell us that if a warder helps a prisoner, he 
will take the prisoner’s place and the whole platoon will flog 
him. We always lived with this threat over our heads” (Hari-
tos-Fatouros 1988, 1117). Further, peer pressure within the 
hierarchy, rituals of masculinity such as exposing members 
to ridicule, and threats were used to stabilise the association: 
“The day you leave, José, we will cut off your head” (Atkin-
son 1989, cited in Crelinsten 1995, 59). Thus, within the 
secret society, a hierarchy associated with the principle of 
order and obedience, rituals, violence, and threats produces 
a social situation that is virtually impossible to escape:
I was trained in interrogation and counterintelligence work. I 
was then given the job of hunting people down and interroga-
ting, torturing and killing them. Because [. . .] of the situation in 
which I was living and what I had to do, I reacted and tried 
repeatedly to leave, but this was impossible, because once you 
are in you cannot get out. (Plate and Darvi 1983, cited in Cre-
linsten 1995, 59).
3.3. The Consequences of Social Closure
As we have seen, social closure plays a crucial role in secur-
ing the existence of any kind of association. In the case of 
the secret society of torturers, we have seen that closing the 
association not only detaches it from the wider society but 
also accomplishes a radical break with moral imperatives. 
Here, closure has effects that allow a deeper understanding 
of the secret society of torturers: a self-conception of the 
secret society as an elite; the significance of supporters who 
are only partly familiar with the interest of the association; 
a specific ruthlessness in pursuing its goal.
3.4. Elitism
Merely the formal fact of closure within an organisation of 
specialists in violence such as the military or the police will 
had to endure torture as if it were an everyday “normal” act. 
They all described a daily routine of flogging in which they 
were often forced to run to exhaustion, fully equipped, and were 
beaten at the same time. […] Older servicemen flogged and 
degraded the freshmen, in preparation for the recruits’ task of 
torturing that was soon to follow. Older servicemen were never 
forced to do so, but they often used degrading remarks as 
negative reinforcements for the young soldiers to produce the 
desired effect. (Haritos-Fatouros 1988, 1116–17)
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lead the secret society of torturers to see itself as elite. This 
self-conception as an elite holds true for the position 
within the wider organisation:
Primary among them was inculcation of the idea that the ESA 
was the strongest and most important supporter of the regime, 
which depended upon the army police for its safety and con-
tinuation. Recruits were made to believe that an ESA service-
man’s action is never questioned: “You can flog a major”, they 
were told. […] (Haritos-Fatouros 1988, 1115)
On the other hand, this effect of developing a self-con-
ception as elite corresponds with processes of degradation 
and dehumanisation that Asad (1996) claims trigger feel-
ings of omnipotence in the torturers that turn them into 
social monsters in a monstrous kind of authority: “We are 
everything for you. We are justice. We are God” (Hamburg 
Institute for Social Research 1987, 24, author’s translation).
3.5. Supporters
Some sections of the military or (secret) police hierarchy, ad -
ministrative staff of the institutions, and even members of a 
government will be only partly initiated into the secret of a 
secret society. This circle “constitutes to a certain extent a 
buffer area against the totally uninitiated” (Simmel 1906, 489) 
and will fulfil an important protective function. While this 
group communicates with the secret society and knows some-
thing about the secret, it also remains detached from it in 
order to conceal the secret and misinform the wider society, as 
was the case with Abu Ghraib when the US Administration 
denied all accusations for as long as possible (including secret 
CIA prisons in other countries) and began an Orwellian 
debate on “torture lite” (McCoy 2006). However, in the case of 
torture, there is also another side of the coin, as the seemingly 
anonymous top of the hierarchy (namely in the White House 
and in the Pentagon) was protected by discretion. When the 
secret society of torturers was uncovered by the Abu Ghraib 
pictures, these rulers were able to deny any kind of involve-
ment in the operations of torture. Rather, they sacrificed 
members of the lower levels of the secret society’s hierarchy 
by pathologising and dishonouring them (Hersh 2004).
3.6. Ruthlessness
Torturers pursue their purpose extremely ruthlessly within 
a social and cultural structure that offers no exit option but 
generates strong conviction on the part of those who 
actually torture, as illustrated by an interview with a former 
torturer of the Greek military junta (cited in Crelinsten 
1995, 60):
Q: Are there methods of torture which you on no account 
would have used? Then? At the time?
A: At the time? No, I don’t think so. We would have been able to 
do everything. […]
Q: Even the worst forms of torture?
A: Yes, regardless.
Q: Even, let us say […] if they ordered you […] to torture [a vic-
tim’s] children before his eyes?
A: Yes.
Q: Would you have done it?
A: Yes, definitely.”6
Not only can we comprehend Simmel’s deeper insight that 
being a member of a criminal band implies a specific free-
dom from moral bonds, but we can also agree with Collins’ 
argument that “we can find a key to cruelty in the con-
nection between morality and the boundaries of a group 
inclusion and exclusion” (1974, 18). Given the complex 
social relations within this secret society, the very fact of 
radically cutting off the secret society of torturers from the 
world outside makes possible the degree of autonomy that 
develops into cruelty on the part of the torturer, as it is “[the] 
internal security organization’s rational rules, hierarchy, and 
procedures [that] must dictate his occupational behaviour” 
(Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo 2002, 106).
4. Tension of Life and Form: Conditions of Behaviour
In their everyday interactions, individuals necessarily cre-
ate social forms that are a consequence of creativity, but 
also constrain their opportunities of behaviour, thereby 
producing specific opportunity structures. There are three 
crucial aspects as far as the secret society of torturers is 
concerned: the decoupling from other associations, domi-
nation, and deindividualisation.
6 The film Your Neighbour’s Son also addresses the 
topic of torturers and victims under the Greek mili-
tary regime; distributed by Amnesty International.
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4.1. The Decoupling of the Secret Society from Other Associations
While the wider society (market, state, family, etc.) makes 
demands on the individual that necessarily generate con-
flicts and contradictions that have to be solved, the secret 
society’s isolation constrains such problems: “The pur-
poses and programs of secret societies require that com-
petitive interests from that plane of the open society 
should be left outside the door” (Simmel 1906, 491). This 
is an important consideration that goes some way towards 
explaining why psychopathology and charges of barbar-
ianism supply such unsatisfactory answers to the question 
of how people are able to torture others. People “develop 
personalities and practices through interchanges with 
other humans, and […] the interchanges themselves 
always involve a degree of negotiation and creativity” 
(Tilly 2003, 5–6). Therefore, we should assume that it is 
the structural supersession or the secret society’s decoup-
ling from all systemic and moral references that make the 
life of specialists in violence seem detached from “reality”. 
There are no contradictions – just simplicity, no moral 
considerations – just orders to be obeyed, no reflections 
on the torturer’s personality – just the performance of a 
single role. Consequently, it is the social form of the secret 
society of torturers and the way it organises its social 
relations by detaching both itself and its members from 
“normal” social life that offer the key to understanding 
torturers’ behaviour.
4.2. Domination
Being both detached from the wider society and a sec-
ondary structure within an existing hierarchy of the mili-
tary or (secret) police, the secret society “exercises a kind 
of absolute sovereignty over its members. This control 
prevents conflicts among them which easily arise in the 
open type of co-ordination.” (Simmel 1906, 491–92). 
Again, the form becomes decisive as it shapes members’ 
behaviour as centralisation triggers the emergence of 
“unlimited and blind obedience to leaders […]. The more 
criminal the purposes of a secret society, the more unli-
mited is likely to be the power of the leaders, and the 
more cruel its exercise” (492). There is hardly a secret 
society whose purpose is more criminal than that of tor-
turers and there seems no way out once a person has 
become a member:
The sociological analysis of the secret society’s structure 
shows unmistakably that while torturers indeed act in a 
context apparently characterised by unlimited moral free-
dom, their operations are restricted by an extremely rigid 
command structure that is of utmost importance, par-
ticularly in the case of a band of criminals such as tor-
turers. This enormous extent of enforcement and 
centralised authority also has far-reaching consequences in 
the event of the secret society being uncovered, as it shows 
how centralisation of power can be used to the advantage 
of those holding power:
Ironically, in the case of state-sponsored violence, it is often only 
the accounts of a few sacrificed lower-ranked violence workers 
that enter into public memory. The upper-level facilitators who 
order and promote torture, and sometimes even carry it out 
themselves, are able to manipulate and control the definition of 
truth so that any information that threatens their secrets is 
labelled “illegitimate” and “against the national interest”. (Hug-
gins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo 2002, 27)
4.3. Deindividualisation
Finally, the specific form of social relations within the 
secret society has profound consequences for the individ-
ual, as unconditional subordination under a centralised 
authority implies a process of deindividualisation. Being 
subjugated under a central authority within a rigid hier-
archy, being forced to accept and take part in (initiation) 
rituals, and being exposed to threats and violence, 
members of the secret society of torturers turn to simple 
means to achieve the ends of this association. Self-
abnegation and a levelling of individuality are important 
consequences for torturers: being subjugated as individuals 
reshapes these people, transforming them into characters 
who lose all their individuality and whose self-abnegation 
becomes stronger, while the rulers enforce a levelling of the 
ruled that emphasises the solidarity of the members (see 
Simmel 1906, 495). This will finally lead to a complete loss 
of compassion in the members/torturers and a typical state 
of irresponsibility for their own actions:
Like the violence bureaucrat that he was, Armando describes 
the Militarised Police as having “a hierarchical regimen.” 
Explaining this further, he argues that “a soldier has to obey the 
hierarchy and the discipline […]. Whoever has a higher rank in 
the hierarchy has power” (Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zim-
bardo 2002, 12)
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5. Dynamics of Processes within the Secret Society of Torturers
The analysis of the secret society of torturers suggests that 
torture should be recognised as a consequence of a specific 
and contradictory form of social relations within the 
association of the secret society: moral freedom versus 
strictest regulation; individual freedom versus hierarchy 
and commitment through rituals; feelings of power and 
superiority versus anonymous leadership and sub-
ordination; omnipotence versus deindividualisation and 
self-abnegation.
Concealing and detaching the secret society of torturers 
from the wider society generates an “inner world” that is 
isolated from the outside world, the consequence being 
processes of “internal dynamics” (Eigendynamik), a con-
cept that Friedhelm Neidhardt (1981) developed after ana-
lysing social processes within the secret society of the 
Baader-Meinhof group. Complementing Simmel’s ideas of 
interaction (Wechselwirkung), this concept makes it poss-
ible to identify the conditions of specific kinds of processes 
within social systems that are more or less socially closed: 
first, no external disturbances of the dominant ideas or 
motives aggravate the secret society’s members or confuse 
the group’s world view; second, once the internal dynamics 
in these closed systems are in motion, none of the 
members can quit the organisation; third, and probably the 
most importantly, the members of a secret society perma-
nently push each other to go on with what obviously has to 
be done, thereby generating motives for the whole process 
to continue. However, internal dynamics within closed 
social systems such as groups of torturers trigger readjust-
ments of the group’s purpose, leading to paradoxical turns 
or contradictory developments (see Neidhardt 1981, 
251–52).
Nevertheless, as Neidhardt argues, internal dynamics do 
stabilise a closed social group. As its members are bound to 
one another by rituals, commitments, a distinct hierarchy, 
the principle of order and obedience, and the feeling of 
being elite and omnipotent, the secret society reconfirms 
itself, while its members reconfirm each other and remain 
loyal to their association. As Neidhardt has shown with 
regard to the internal dynamics within secret societies, 
these processes cannot be based solely on feelings of loyalty 
but need a stronger foundation. “Individual motives require 
mutual support in systems of meaning that enable the indi-
vidual to both interpret his or her world relatively coher-
ently and to legitimise his or her actions for him or herself 
(253, author’s translation). Such constructions of meaning 
are facilitated by developing an “everyday theory” that 
explains to the members of the secret society coherently, 
simply, and consistently why they are doing what they are 
doing (254).
In order to preserve the conviction that allows the secret 
society’s members to go on, two techniques play a crucial 
role. First, techniques of rationalising, or “neutralizing” 
(Sykes and Matza 1957), and a specific kind of “responsibil-
ity” (Scott and Lyman 1968) enable the members to define 
their own situation as an emergency and allow for a uni-
tary world view. In this state of mind:
[to] have a feeling of being at war simply justifies the moral 
state of emergency and offers relief through reference to anal-
ogies provided in abundance by history’s battlefields. The oppo-
nent is the enemy; killing him is a soldier’s duty. Moral con-
sequences can be turned into technical ones. To murder then 
simply means “to inflict losses”. (Neidhardt 1981, 255, author’s 
translation).
Second, techniques of immunising allow members to separ-
ate off experiences outside the secret society, the con-
sequence being a state of indifference towards both the 
world outside and the victims of torture. The violent attack 
becomes simply functional.
In the case of torture, we have to add that the members of 
this secret society pass through a socialisation process, 
since they are not only taught the techniques of torture. 
Rather, by intensive instruction and indoctrination (Hari-
tos-Fatouros 1991), they internalise both constructions of 
meaning that plausibly justify their alleged superior iden-
tity and the conception of strict “we-they” dichotomies that 
are preconditions for devaluation and dehumanisation of 
their potential victims (Asad 1996).
Within such an organizational framework, there was no place 
for emotionality. The rational violence worker could not have 
positive feelings for a victim, and he even had to modulate his 
extreme negative feelings so as not to go “too far” with a victim. 
(Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo 2002, 106)
IJCV: Vol. 9 (1) 2015, pp. 106 – 120
Jürgen Mackert: The Secret Society of Torturers  117
6. Contradictions of Behaviour
In the face of all these processes within the secret 
society of torturers, those who are subordinated to an 
anonymous authority now themselves turn into anony-
mous and absolute rulers;7 they carry their own experi-
ence of deindividualisation and self-abnegation to the 
extreme in relation to their victims. As the latter are 
deprived of their individuality, they are no longer per-
ceived as individuals. Humiliation and subordination 
under an omni potent and anonymous power generates a 
far-reaching closed action system that knows virtually 
no external disturbances. Once again, Neidhardt’s analy-
sis helps us to understand how specific internal 
dynamics are triggered by the way perpetrators and vic-
tims are fixated on one another, with neither of them 
being able to escape from the system, the fatal con-
sequence being that the asserted original motive of 
gathering information can easily be superimposed by 
secondary motives such as feelings of hyper-omni -
potence or the sense of having the power of life and 
death. Again, the social dynamics of this situation are 
crucial for a better understanding of how and why 
people become able to torture others. Grüny makes this 
point: the sense of self is:
highly insecure since it demands a constant continuation of the 
torture; as soon as it ends, the power of the torturer is termin-
ated. As both the loss of consciousness of the victim and his or 
her death threaten the possibility of continuing the torture, the 
perpetrator tries to avoid both these situations. However, since a 
victim cannot be tortured endlessly, the torturer has to con-
stantly look for new victims. (Grüny 2003, 106, author’s trans-
lation)8
The social situation of torture is thus characterised by 
highly complex social dynamics: the torturer’s self, having 
been reshaped within the structure and culture of the 
secret society, is now in a position to reshape the self of the 
victim in front of him. Thus, we can identify the critical 
aspects of this situation:9
• Absolute power on the part of the torturers corresponds 
to absolute powerlessness on the part of the victims, in-
dicating the enormous destructiveness of torture: 
“Among the practices of the modern state, torture is the 
least understood, one that lures its practitioners, high 
and low, with fantasies of dominion” (McCoy 2006, 
12–13). The intensified asymmetry of power relations 
between a group of specialists in violence on the one 
hand and a radically isolated individual on the other 
opens the door to an extremely destructive form of vio -
lence. The victims are unable to defend themselves 
against their torturers.
• Absolute knowledge on the part of the torturers cor-
responds to absolute ignorance on the part of the vic-
tims. In torture, social relations are no longer aimed at 
reciprocity and negotiation. Rather, it is the torturers 
who write the script: “On a tout le temps, dit le com-
mandant, ils sont tous comme ça au début : on mettra 
un mois, deux mois ou trois mois, mais il parlera” (Alleg 
[1958a] 2008, 69).10 It is the torturers who decide what 
exactly will happen – the victim can only hold out fatal-
istically.
• Fixed but non-transparent intentions of the torturers 
are accompanied by victims’ efforts to guess these. They 
think about what will happen next, what the torturers 
want to know, how they can evade torture, and whether 
they will survive if they betray others or make false ac-
cusations:
The antagonism between perpetrator and victim indicates the 
extreme limits of social reciprocity. [. . .] The victim is entirely in 
the enemy’s hand, at the mercy of his rage, lust, and will to 
annihilation. Violence is unrestricted by any counterforce. Reci-
procity is superfluous. (Sofsky 2005, 89, author’s translation)
The victims can neither resort to experiences in everyday 
processes of interaction nor relate these to their current 
situation. In a radically existential way, the situation of tor-
ture is extraordinary.
7 We can take this literally, as many victims of tor-
ture have to wear hoods for long periods of time and 
therefore cannot see their surroundings. 
8 This is the very point where torture may turn into 
an excess, where the torturer knows no limits and 
sheer cruelty takes over.
9 See Doerr-Zegers et al. 1992 for a psychological 
perspective. The authors also define an asymmetry 
of power, anonymity and obscurity with respect to 
time and space as crucial elements of the torture 
situation as well as the psychological aspects.
10 “’We have time,’ said the major. ‘They’re all like 
that at the beginning. We’ll take a month, two 
months, or three months, but he’ll talk’” (Alleg 
1958b, 69).
IJCV: Vol. 9 (1) 2015, pp. 106 – 120
Jürgen Mackert: The Secret Society of Torturers  118
• Absolute clarity on the part of the torturers corresponds 
with absolute obscurity on the part of the victims. The 
victims generally do not know whom they are dealing 
with, who is standing or sitting opposite them; some do 
not even know why they are in the hands of torturers. 
The whole situation remains opaque. Thus, the tor-
turers’ domination can be exerted anonymously and be-
comes infinite:
“What was the problem that caused them to arrest you?” the 
interrogator asked.
I said I didn’t know.
“The Organization isn’t stupid,” he said. “It never catches people 
who aren’t guilty. Now think again – what did you do wrong?”
“I don’t know,’ I said again.” (Chandler 1999, 77)
• Spatial and temporal orientation on the part of the tor-
turers who have a life “outside” and “afterwards”, in other 
words, move back into a “normal world”, corresponds to 
a purposeful and systematic disorientation on the part of 
the victims, for whom there is only a “timeless inside” 
left: “Make sure they never know where they are. It’s a 
disorientation thing. Whenever you’re going somewhere, 
make sure you spin them around and you blindfold 
them, and you never take them on a direct route” (inter-
view with an El Salvadoran death squad member, cited 
in Crelinsten 1995, 50). Victims should not know where 
they are, how long they will be there, or whether they 
will ever leave again. And this disorientation also applies 
to the experience of time: “Je dus m’endormir d’un coup, 
car, lorsque je le revis, j’eus l’impression qu’un instant 
seulement s’était écoulé. Et à partir de là, je n’eus plus au-
cune notion du temps” (Alleg [1958a] 2008, 36).11
7. Conclusion
Stanley Milgram’s (1974) well-known experiment shocked 
the public by showing that two thirds of all participants 
were willing to torment other persons on the orders of an 
examiner who told them that the electric shocks (which in 
reality would have been lethal) were necessary to induce 
the subjects to behave in a specific way. Far from restricting 
the results to “normal persons’” belief in authority, Zim-
bardo (2009) argues that the “system” in which people act 
causes their behaviour.
Although we have to admit that there will always be sadists 
and psychopaths among torturers, this contributes as little 
towards providing a proper explanation as the idea that 
obedience of authority turns people into torturers (not to 
mention the fact that laboratory conditions bear no 
relation to the processes of reshaping self that create ruth-
less torturers). However, social psychology is extremely 
helpful in fleshing out details of a proper explanation, as we 
learn a great deal about socialising processes, atrocity train-
ing, and exercises in obedience, etc. (Huggins, Haritos-
Fatouros, and Zimbardo 2002) that support the overall 
argument of people being able to learn to torture others.
Entering a unit of torturers means stepping into a social 
situation that triggers a process of both suppressing the 
self-image and reshaping the self that has to adjust to a new 
kind of environment. In the course of an initiation process 
the prospective member of the secret society has to 
undergo, he or she experiences the omnipotent power of 
the representatives of the hierarchical and authoritarian 
organisation. It is within this kind of framework that the 
individual has to act, to build up a new kind of personal 
identity and follow rules in order to accomplish given 
objectives. A number of techniques such as degradation, 
humiliation, being subjected to violence, and maybe even 
torture characterise torturers’ initiation as a process of “dis-
culturation” of the novice.
Within an extreme social situation enhanced by the veil of 
secrecy, the individual is exposed without protection to the 
emergence of a new kind of identity. However, contrary to 
Goffman’s (1961) conception of a “total institution”, there is 
for the torturer no fundamental barrier between the world 
11 “I must have fallen asleep suddenly, because, 
when I saw them again, I had the impression that 
only an instant had passed. And at this point, I lost 
all idea of time” (Alleg 1958b, 56).
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within the secret society and the “normal” world outside. 
Rather, they live in both worlds and one might argue that 
only the strict separation of the two worlds with their com-
pletely contradictory rules of conduct permits torturers to 
have a normal life as fathers and husbands, in other words 
a social environment that offers (maybe unknowingly) sup-
port and encouragement for what allegedly has to be done 
(cf. Lifton 1986).
From the perspective of a relational sociology, all this 
happens under circumstances that emphasise not only 
structural and cultural effects that generate opportunity 
structures for trained torturers but also the crucial social 
relations within the secret society of torturers. The present 
article shows that we have to look more closely at the social 
shaping of extremely violent behaviour in order to fully 
explain what people are capable of doing to others.
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